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Abstract.AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), provides the 
highest level of security by utilizing the strongest 128 bit Al-
gorithm to encrypt and authenticate the data. AES commercial 
security algorithm has proved to be effective in Unmanned 
Aerial vehicles which is used  for military purpose  such as  
enemy tracking , environmental monitoring meteorology, map 
making etc .The  demand to protect the sensitive and valuable 
data transmitted from  UAV ( Unmanned Aerial Vehicles )  to 
ground has increased in Defense and hence the need to use  
onboard encryption . In order to avoid data corruption due to 
single even upsets (SEU’s) a novel fault tolerant model of 
AES is presented which is based on the Hamming error cor-
rection code. For this work a problem was chosen that first 
addresses the encryption of UAV imaging data using the effi-
cient   AES CBC mode .A detailed analysis of the effect of 
single even upsets (SEUs) on imaging data during on-board 
encryption is carried out. The impact of faults in the data oc-
curring during transmission to ground due to noisy channels is 
analyzed .The performance for the above fault tolerant model 
is measured using power and throughput. 
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1Introduction   
UAV used for military applications takes images of the 
Earth with smart and sophisticated imaging sensors. Multi-
spectral images of the Earth captured by optical on-board 
cameras can be used in monitoring  the environment and dis-
asters, vegetation control, map marking, urban planning, etc. 
The real problem now is towards UAV, as they require small-
er budgets to build and launch and also involve less mainte-
nance costs. The imaging payload units of UAV comprise 
imagers, memory, and high-rate data transceivers. UAV are 
equipped with on-board encryption to protect the data trans-
mitted to the ground station. Encryption is used to protect data 
from unauthorized users.. But now UAV manufacturers are 
realizing the importance of on-board encryption to protect 
valuable data.At present, more and more UAV’s are equipped 
with on-board encryption to protect the data transmitted. 
Advanced Encryption Standard (also known as Rijndael) 
took its place, various AES implementations have been pro-
posed both in software and hardware. 
 
The Rijndael algorithm approved as the Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) by the US National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) is a block cipher, which encrypts one 
block of data at a time [1]. To encrypt multiple blocks, modes 
of operation have been defined by NIST. AES is being adopt-
ed by many organizations across the world. Because of its 
simplicity, flexibility, easiness of implementation, and high 
throughput AES is used in many different applications rang-
ing from smart cards to big servers. In fact, hardware imple-
mentations of AES are well suited to resource-constrained 
embedded applications like satellites. There are various hard-
ware implementations of the AES algorithm on platforms like 
application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) and field pro-
grammable gate arrays (FPGAs) that achieve a significant 
throughput ranging from a few Mbit/s to Gbit/s. Thus the re-
quirements of UAV for high-rate data transmission are met by 
existing AES implementations. However, in addition to high 
throughput, immunity of the encryption process against faults 
is very important .UAV operate in a harsh radiation environ-
ment and consequently any electronic system used on board, 
including the encryption processor, is susceptible to radiation-
induced faults [2]. Most of the faults that occur in on-board 
electronic  devices are radiation-induced bit flips called single 
event upsets (SEUs[3].If faulty data is transmitted to the 
ground station, request for data retransmission has to wait 
until the next UAV revisit period, with revisit time varying 
from a couple of hours to weeks. In order to prevent faulty 
data transmissions, there is a need for an error-free encryption 
scheme on board[4]. UAV data can further get corrupted dur-
ing transmission to ground due to noise in the transmission 
Channel. The impact of radiation on semiconductor devices 
on board depends on orbit altitude, orientation, and time [5]. 
Reliability is the most important issue in avionics design. 
SEUs must be detected and corrected on board before sending 
the data to ground. The triple modular redundancy (TMR) 
technique is one of the most widely used redundancy-based 
SEU mitigation techniques in satellites [6]. However, with the 
TMR technique the area and power overheads triplicate in 
comparison with the original module.[7] This paper addresses 
reliability issues of the AES algorithm. A detailed analysis of 
the impact of faults during on-board encryption and during 
transmission for the AES-CBC mode is presented. 
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2 Advanced Encryption Standard–
Algorithm and Modes Of Operation 
The AES is a symmetric key algorithm, in which both the 
sender and the receiver use a single key for encryption and 
decryption[8]. AES defines the data block length to 128 bits, 
and the key lengths to 128,192, or 256 bits. It is an iterative 
algorithm and each  iteration is called a round. The total num-
ber of rounds, Nr, is 10, 12, or 14 when the key length is 128, 
192, or 256 bits, respectively. Each round in AES, except the 
final round, consists of four transformations: Sub Bytes, Shift 
Rows, Mix Columns, and Add Round Key. The final round 
does not have the Mix Columns transformation. The decryp-
tion flow is simply the reverse of the encryption flow and 
each operation is the inverse of the corresponding one in the 
encryption process. The round transformation of AES and its 
steps operate on some intermediate results, called state. The 
state can be visualized as a rectangular matrix with four rows. 
The number of columns in the state is denoted by Nb and is 
equal to the block length in bits divided by 32. For a 128 bit 
data block (16bytes) the value of Nb is 4, hence the state is 
treated as a 4×4 matrix and each element in the matrix repre-
sents a byte. For the sake of simplicity, in the rest of the pa-
per, both the data block and the key lengths are considered as 
128 bit long. However all the discussions and the results hold 
true for 192 bit and 256 bit keys as well. 
 
3 Transformations Of AES Algorithm 
All the four transformations of the AES round work on the 
principles of finite fields. The number of the elements in a 
finite field is called the order of the field[9]. A finite field of 
order p
n
 is generally denoted as GF (P
n
), where GF stands for 
Galois field, p is the characteristic of the finite field, and n is 
the number of bits used to represent the field elements. The 
basic operations of AES are defined over the elements of the 
field GF (2
8
). The specification of AES has adopted polyno-
mial representation of the byte elements of GF (2
8
) with coef-
ficients over the field GF (2). A polynomial representation of 
byte a(x) with coefficients over the field GF (2) is represented 
as follows: 
 ( )      
  
          =    
     
     
     
     
  
   
  a1x
1
+a0                      (1) 
 
Where ai= {0,1}. 
 
 
 
Fig .1. Block Diagram of AES Algorithm 
 
The binary representation of the polynomial given 
by (1) is as follows: 
 
a(x) →a7a6a5a4a3a2a1a0   (2) 
 
For example, a byte element represented in binary 
form as 1100 0001 is written in polynomial form as 
x
7
 +x
6
 +1. 
The operation of addition using byte elements is defined as 
addition of the corresponding polynomials. In case of poly-
nomials over GF (2) addition is just an exclusive OR (XOR) 
operation. For byte multiplication the following irreducible 
polynomial 
is used in AES: 
 
 ( )                                
(3) 
Multiplication in GF (2
8
) is denoted as . The multiplica-
tion of two polynomials a(x) and b(x) is defined as the  
algebraic product of the polynomials modulo the irreducible 
polynomial m(x) as below:   
 
c(x)=a(x)-b(x)= a(x)b(x)modm(x)                          (4) 
 The SubBytes transformation is a nonlinear byte substitu-
tion, operating on each byte of the state matrix independently. 
Each byte of the state is first inverted in GF (2
8
) and then pro-
cessed through an affine transformation. The SubBytes trans-
formation can be calculated on the fly for each state byte. 
Alternatively, for the sake of computational simplicity, Sub 
Bytes can be computed in advance and stored in a look-up 
table (LUT) of 2
8
 = 256 elements called S-Box. Shift Rows 
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cyclically left shifts the last three rows of the state by 1, 2, 
and 3 bytes, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2. Fault Propagation during encryption in AES-CBC 
mode 
Mix Columns transforms every column in the state by multi-
plying it with a predefined  polynomial .  
 
4 Fault propagation analysis 
Due to fault propagation even a single bit error during en-
cryption of one block of AES can result in corruption of 50% 
of the bits in the final encrypted data on average. In addition, 
when using the AES feedback modes faults occurring in one 
block can propagate to other blocks because of the feed-
back[10]. In this section propagation to subsequent blocks of 
single bit faults occurring both during encryption and during 
transmission is investigated. 
4.1 Fault Propagation in AES-CBC Mode  
Cipher Block Chaining Mode: The CBC mode, illustrated 
in Fig. 3, is the mode in which the plain data block is XOR-ed 
with the cipher data of the previous block before it is encrypt-
ed. The first block is XOR-ed with an initial vector (IV), 
which is a random number. In Fig.2,P1,P2…. Pn represent the 
plain data,C1,C2….Cn represent the cipher data and K is the 
key used in both encryption and decryption. The plain data 
blocks, the cipher data blocks, and the key are of 128 bit 
length each. The ―E‖ and ―D‖ blocks in Fig.2 denote an en-
cryption and decryption function using the AES algorithm, 
respectively. 
The effect of an SEU during encryption in the CBC mode is 
illustrated in Fig.2, where the SEU occurrence is marked by 
the star symbol * and the corrupted data blocks are represent-
ed by black boxes. If  SEU occurs while encrypting the plain 
block P1,the cipher block C1 will be corrupted and hence the 
decrypted block P1 will also be corrupted. However, this cor-
rupted data is not propagated to the subsequent blocks despite 
the feedback. The reason for this is that the corrupted cipher 
block C1 is XOR-ed twice (with the plain block P2 before 
encryption and with the cipher block C2 after decryption) as 
shown in Fig.2.Performing the XOR operation two times with 
this corrupted cipher block C1 neutralizes the fault and pre-
vents propagation of faults to subsequent blocks as shown 
below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.3.Fault Propagation during transmission in CBC mode 
In contrast, a fault occurring in an encrypted block during 
transmission propagates to the next block, as shown in 
Fig.3,where the transmission fault is shown by the star sym-
bol , during the transmission of the cipher block C1. The de-
crypted block P1 is completely garbled and the subsequent 
decrypted block P2 will have bit errors at the same position as 
the original erroneous block C1.The decrypted blocks follow-
ing the second block will not be   affected by the fault. Hence 
the CBC mode is self synchronizing. 
5 Fault-tolerant model of the AES Algo-
rithm 
This section presents a novel fault-tolerant model for the 
AES algorithm, which is immune to radiation-induced SEUs 
occurring during encryption and can be used in hardware im-
plementation in an on-board small OE satellites. The model is 
based on a self-repairing EDAC scheme, which is built in the 
AES algorithmic flow and utilizes the Hamming error correct-
ing code. The proposed Hamming code based fault-tolerant 
model of AES can be adapted to all the five modes of AES to 
correct SEUs on board. Even though the calculation of the 
Hamming code is carried out within the AES, it does not alter 
any of the transformations of the algorithm and does not af-
fect in any way the operation of AES. The disadvantage of 
this method is that the implementation of the codes based 
EDAC will require an additional encoding stage to encode the 
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plain data blocks  which will inevitably add an overhead to 
on-board resources and processing. 
 
5.1 Model Description 
The proposed fault-tolerant model is based on the singe er-
ror correcting Hamming code (12,8), the simplest of the 
available error correcting codes. The Hamming code (12,8) 
detects and corrects a single bit fault in a byte and it is a good 
choice for satellite applications, as most frequently occurring 
faults in on-board electronics are bit flips induced by radiation 
.However, the AES correction model can be extended to cor-
rect multiple bit faults by using other error correcting codes 
such as the   modified Hamming code (16,8), the Read-
Solomon codes, etc. The procedure to calculate the parity 
check bits is discussed below. 
Calculation of the Hamming Code: The parity check bits of 
each byte of the S-Box LUTs are pre calculated. These Ham-
ming code bits can be formally expressed as below: 
h(SRD[a]) → hRD[a] 
 
h((SRD[a]   2) → h2RD[a]                                
(6) 
 
h((SRD[a]   3) →h3RD[a] 
 
where a is the state byte and h represents the calculation of the 
Hamming code. 
As can be seen from (6), hRD is given by the parity check 
bits of the S-Box LUT SRD, h2RD is given by the parity check 
bits of (SRD  02), and h3RD is given by the parity check bits 
of (SRD  3).The procedure to derive the hRD parity bits is 
described below by taking one state byte a, represented by 
bits (b7,b6,b5,b4,b3,b2,b1,b0) as an example. The Hamming 
code of the state byte a is a four-bit   parity code, represented 
by bits (p3, p2 ,p1,p0),which are derived as follows: 
p3→  is parity of bit group b7,b6,b4,b3,b1 
 
p2 → is parity of bit group b7,b5,b4,b2,b1 
 
p1 → is parity of bit group b6,b5,b4,b0 (7) 
 
p0 → is parity of bit group b3,b2,b1,b0 
The Hamming bits of all the bytes of table SRD are Pre-
calculated and stored in the form of a memory table referred 
to as the hRD table. The Hamming code h2RD is given by the 
parity check bits of (SRD  02). The Galois field multiplica-
tion of a state byte a with {02} is defined as follows 
{02}   *  +  ( )    ( ) 
 
   =     ( )    ( ) 
  
  = (x.         i x
i
) mod m(x) 
 
  = an-1     
   
    
     
   
    
                     
(8) 
 
  = an-1 m0+ (            ) 
      
    
where{02} is represented as x in polynomial form, mi repre-
sent the coefficients of the irreducible polynomial m defined 
in the AES algorithm. 
The Hamming code of the above product h2RD is calculat-
ed as follows 
   h2RD = h({02}  a) 
           = h( an-1m0 +              )
   
                      (9) 
 
Using the irreducible polynomial given by (3) and 
n = 8, (9) can be rewritten as 
h2RD = h(               
 
   )                (10) 
 
Unlike the calculation of parity bit of a byte, the calculation of 
Hamming parity bits depends on the position of the bits in a 
byte and therefore it is not possible to further simplify (10). 
Hence the h2RD parity bits are calculated beforehand, and are 
stored in the form of a memory table, which is referred to as 
the h2RD table. The Hamming table h3RD is given by the pari-
ty check bits of (SRD  {03}). The Galois field multiplication 
of a state byte a by {03} can be described as follows. 
 
{03}   a = ({02} {01}) a 
 
                = x .a(x)mod m(x)  a(x)mod m(x)           (11) 
 
Similar to the parity function, the Hamming function is also a 
linear operator. The Hamming code of the above product h3RD 
is written as follows. 
 
h3RD = h({03} − a) = h2RD hRD                                  (12) 
 
Hence, the h3RD parity bits can be calculated from 
thehRD and h2RD parity bits and therefore it is not necessary to 
store them in the form of a parity memory table. Once we 
have all the parity bits, the next step is to detect and correct 
the faults by predicting the Hamming code bits using the pre-
calculated Hamming code bits. 
 
5.2 Detection and Correction of Fault Using   
Hamming Code Bits  
 
The Hamming code matrix of the Sub Bytes transformation is 
predicted by referring to the hRD table. The Hamming code 
matrix prediction for Shift rows involves a simple cyclic rota-
tion of the Sub Bytes Hamming code bits. The  
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Hamming code state matrix for Mix Columns is predicted 
with the help of the hRD,h2RDand h3RD parity bits and is ex-
pressed by the equation below  
h0,j =h2RD[a0,j] h3RD[a1,j ] hRD[a2,j ] hRD[a3,j ] 
 
h1,j=hRD[a0,j] h2RD[a1,j] h3RD[a2,j ] hRD[a3,j ] 
 
h2,j=hRD[a0,j] hRD[a1,j] h2RD[a2,j ] h3RD[a3,j ] 
 
h3,j=h3RD[a0,j] hRD[a1,j ] hRD[a2,j ] h2RD[a3,j ] 
 
   0 ≤ j ≤4                          (13) 
By substituting (12) in (13), the Hamming code matrix for 
MixColumns can be predicted with just two tables, hRD and 
h2RD.As shown in Fig. 4, for each transformation, the Ham-
ming code is predicted using the input data state to the trans-
formation by referring to the parity check bit tables and also 
the parity check bits are calculated from the output of the 
transformation. The predicted and calculated check bits are 
compared as discussed below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Fault detection and correction  
 
flow chart 
 
    Let the predicted check bits of the transformation input be 
represented by (x3,x2,x1,x0) and the calculated check bits of 
the transformation output be represented by (y3,y2,y1,y0). The 
location of the faulty bit is detected by comparing the predict-
ed and calculated Hamming check bits .Once the   faulty bit 
position is identified, the fault correction is performed by 
simply flipping the particular bit. The encryption is then con-
tinued without any interruption. Here we assume that the 
Hamming code tables will be protected from SEUs by tradi-
tional memory protection techniques in satellite applications 
like memory scrubbing and refreshing. 
5.3  Hardware and Software Details 
In UAV high throughput encryption processing is required 
to comply with high-rate data transmission bandwidth  up to a 
few hundred Mbit/s . In order to meet the requirement for 
high throughput processing, hardware implementation is con-
sidered to be the preferred choice. The Verilog hardware de-
scription language (HDL) can be used for coding, and  model 
sim can be is used for the functional, pre synthesis, and post 
synthesis simulations of the design. The HDL designs will be 
tested extensively using the KAT and MCT vectors provided 
by NIST. Synthesis and   implementation are carried out using   
Xilinx ISE, respectively. 
6 Conclusion  
This paper investigates the reliability of the AES CBC  al-
gorithm to encrypt UAV data for defense application . The 
AES CBC algorithm was discussed in detail and its ad-
vantages and disadvantages for encryption of  multispectral 
images are compared. The impact of the propagation of SEU 
faults occurring during on-board encryption is analyzed. In 
addition, an analysis of the propagation of faults that occur 
during transmission due to noise is carried out. In order to 
avoid data corruption due to SEUs, a fault detection and cor-
rection model is proposed based on the Hamming code (12,8). 
The model provides an SEU self-recovering capability, which 
is built in the AES data path. Also it consumes a very small 
portion of the power available to the payload unit. The esti-
mated hardware overhead of the optimal fault-tolerant AES IP 
core is 49% in terms of area and 152% in terms of power. The 
model can be extended for detection and correction of multi-
ple bit faults by using other more sophisticated error-
correcting codes such Reed-Solomon codes, etc. The pro-
posed fault detection and correction AES model targets the 
defense application domain ( UAV) .  
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